"Growing anti-Indian rhetoric within the GOP is pushing some lifelong conservative Indian American voters to reconsider their allegiance to the Republican Party"
I think ignoring Russia’s genocidal rhetoric and hideous war crimes is a pretty clear giveaway of whose side at least one of America’s top elite oligarchs is on. At what point do we ask whether they’re acting as Russian assets?
When rhetoric shifts to blaming Ukraine for being invaded, Russia gets a diesel deal and a sanctions waiver, intelligence sharing stops, and Starlink gets throttled at the same time, that's just too much of a coincidence to be anything but a new US state policy.
The author said US rhetoric was reminiscent of the 2021 debate over whether Ukraine should be pressured to meet Russia’s demands. They wrote that such pressure would not bring peace but would clear the way for Russia’s plans, adding that they still stood by that argument. https://t.co/SujIRtoInW #Ukraine #Russia #Rhetoric #US #UA #RU
Trump openly siding with Russian aggression, not just rhetorically but now with US policy intervention that boosts the Russian economy and facilitates Russian attacks in Ukraine, appears to have broken a dam. Leaders who held back in an attempt to keep Trump on side are admitting that didn't work.
Among Keir Starmer's worst deeds were his legislative and rhetorical attacks on nature protection. In those two wasted years, we spiralled backwards, even from the Tory legacy. At this week's biodiversity summit, the Burnham govt should pledge to turn that round. www.theguardian.com/commentisfre...
Hey so not to be morbid, but if this is true, a cerebral hemorrhage wouldn't have to kill him to take him out of a leadership role. Along the full spectrum of prospective recoveries, there aren't many that would allow for the Invincible Strong Man rhetoric to survive unscathed.
ITV footage shows racist, sexual, violent rhetoric among Reform members. These lunatics say “King Charles is a f***ing Muslim… " and want him to be beheaded. They want concentration camps for migrants, violence against minorities. Return of the Nazis, 100 years after the Cable Street resistance.
The author wrote that the APEC summit, scheduled for Nov. 18–19, was too close to the US midterms to influence votes, although Donald Trump would try to portray any “winning” rhetoric as a success. They said any agreement reached would be undermined by the EU and Ukraine, and argued that China could not act as a broker or neutral party. #APEC #USPolitics #InternationalRelations #US #EU #UK #CN #UA
Netanyahu is a genocidal war criminal who belongs in the Hague, but Jews were not considered ethnic Poles based on the Polish government, and Polish Jewish last names were forced on families against their will. This kind of conspiratorial rhetoric about Jews faking their identity is gross.
Develop #Creative #Thinking: Practice linking seemingly unrelated objects. Expand Active Vocblry: use more words, as active vocabulary is smaller than passive. Master #Rhetoric & Logic: Understand logical proof and how emphasis changes meaning. #trainer #publicspeaking
The author wrote that unemployment was rising in Europe and that the number of unemployed people in Hungary had increased by 17,000. They said the European Commission had responded with bureaucratic assurances that it was working on the issue, but feared its efforts would worsen rather than improve the situation. https://t.co/LLHY8pRbhP #Unemployment #Europe #Economy #EU #HU
The Political Hypocrisy: Condemning Islam at Home, Accepting Qatar’s Millions Abroad Donald Trump has repeatedly portrayed Islam as a threat to American society and championed restrictions targeting people from predominantly Muslim countries. Yet his administration accepted a luxury Boeing 747-8 from Qatar, a wealthy Islamic monarchy, for use as a presidential aircraft. The contrast is hard to ignore: if Islam and the countries associated with it are supposedly a threat to America, why is a gift worth hundreds of millions of dollars from one of those countries acceptable? When it comes to political rhetoric, Islam is framed as a danger. When it comes to diplomacy, power, and luxury, a wealthy Islamic state becomes a welcome partner. That raises serious questions about consistency, transparency, and accountability. Is this about defending American values, or does that principle become flexible when there are political and strategic benefits to be gained? The real issue is not Qatar’s religion. It is whether a president who warns Americans about foreign threats should be accepting such an extraordinary gift from a foreign government—and whether the public can be confident that American interests come first.
No Relief Coming At The Pump Despite all the rhetoric in recent days intended to create more product supply, it's all marginal in the face of an oil market that if anything looks like it's getting tighter. bobeunlimited.substack.com/p/no-relief-...
The author told American followers that increasingly heated debates between opposing factions on French television reminded them of what they had witnessed in 2015, citing the rhetoric, polarization and intensity of the confrontations. The post ended mid-sentence. #France #Radicalization #Polarization #US #FR
The author wrote that they hoped, despite little optimism, that Ambassador Dan Fried’s important question would not be treated as rhetorical.
Iran’s cognitive warfare – when AI becomes the operating layer of state propaganda Iranian state-linked influence operators were not using artificial intelligence simply to write faster social-media posts. According to Anthropic’s September 2026 threat intelligence report, three separate operations connected to Iranian propaganda institutions were using Claude to help construct the machinery behind what the operators themselves called “soft war” and “cognitive warfare” – non-military efforts intended to shape public opinion inside Iran and abroad. Anthropic linked the activity to the Islamic Culture and Communications Organization (ICCO), which operates under Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance; the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi; and the Bina Cultural Observatory, part of the Islamic Propaganda Organization. The company said each operation was run by someone working within or on behalf of the named institution. The attribution was based on a combination of account telemetry, institutional references disclosed during conversations, branded documents and open-source corroboration. Anthropic subsequently removed the accounts. AI as an operational headquarters The most significant feature of the operation was the role assigned to AI. Claude was used to develop campaign plans, doctrine manuals, coded project portfolios, persona systems, target databases, early-warning protocols, amplification schedules and ministerial planning documents. Anthropic described the model as the principal administrative and operational layer supporting the three campaigns, allowing relatively small groups of operators to create organisational structures and planning material that would otherwise have required a much larger staff. This distinction matters. The reported use of AI went considerably beyond content generation. Operators were using the model to help organise how influence activity should function: which audiences to target, which identities should deliver particular narratives, how official material should be repackaged and when amplification should take place. Human operators still determined objectives and supplied the underlying political doctrine; AI helped translate those decisions into an operational system. Anthropic found that all three operations explicitly connected their activity to Jihad al-Tabyin, often translated as “explanatory jihad”, a concept used within the Iranian state system to frame information activity as both a strategic and ideological responsibility. In internal planning material examined by the company, this doctrine was not merely rhetorical: it informed manuals and campaign structures used by the operators. ‘Not the narrator, but the director’ One sentence contained in the ICCO material captures the model particularly clearly. According to Anthropic, an operator described the role of Iranian cultural attachés as being “not to be the narrator, but the director” of the narrative. The distinction reveals the logic of attribution laundering. Instead of publishing an overt state message and asking foreign audiences to believe it, the operator attempts to create the appearance that the same narrative emerged independently from journalists, activists, foreign writers or ordinary citizens. Anthropic found that Claude was used specifically to make content appear to come from foreign authors or independent media organisations and to design hashtag campaigns that looked grassroots rather than centrally organised. The ICCO operation reportedly used the organisation’s international cultural network as part of this structure. Anthropic found ministerial-level documents carrying official ICCO branding, including a nine-part international influence portfolio. This makes the operation particularly significant because the infrastructure was not limited to anonymous social-media accounts; it intersected with formal state institutions and an existing network of cultural representation abroad. A multilingual content factory A second operation was associated with the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi and what Anthropic described as a “cognitive warfare command room” operating from a seminary in Mashhad. Its organisers ran a multi-province content production system known internally as Manjanegh, or “Catapult”. According to Anthropic, dozens of activists were involved in repackaging publicly available reporting from Iranian security institutions under different personas so that the material no longer appeared directly connected to those institutions. The network used Claude to transform official government intelligence bulletins into customised material in Farsi, Arabic, Urdu, Malay, Spanish and English, while planning expansion into a total of 20 languages. Distribution extended across Iranian platforms such as Eitaa, Bale and Rubika and international services including X, Instagram, Telegram, TikTok and YouTube. Anthropic also documented paid amplification across more than 100 Iranian channels, including channels associated with IRGC narratives. The scale should nevertheless be interpreted carefully. Anthropic documented production infrastructure and some real-world dissemination, but it did not demonstrate that all planned campaigns were fully deployed or that they meaningfully changed public opinion. The company placed the operation in Category Three of its Breakout Scale, indicating multi-platform activity with content observed in external distribution channels, rather than evidence of strategic impact on entire populations. From security bulletins to apparently independent voices The Bina Cultural Observatory operation provides another example of the same architecture. Anthropic linked a director-level official at Bina to activity in which Claude generated messaging in the voice of an IRGC spokesperson. During the 2026 US–Israel–Iran war, the network also attributed false claims to Western institutions including CSIS, Brookings and RAND. The apparent objective was to make Iranian state-aligned claims look as though they had been independently validated by respected foreign research organisations. That technique is more sophisticated than simply publishing propaganda under a false name. It attempts to manufacture a chain of external validation: official information is transformed into apparently independent commentary, which can then be recirculated as evidence that outside observers have reached the same conclusion. Anthropic also found target databases naming international officials and Iranian opposition figures, as well as aggressive counter-narrative material directed against the Bahá’í community. These findings show that the infrastructure was designed not only for broad messaging but also for targeted influence activity against specific groups and individuals. What AI changed The Iranian operations described by Anthropic did not create a new doctrine of influence. Iran has used cultural institutions, official media, aligned organisations and covert or semi-covert online networks for years. What AI changed was the economics and organisational capacity of that model. A relatively small team could use the system to draft doctrine, create personas, translate material, structure target databases, produce campaign calendars and generate multiple versions of the same message for different audiences. The operator remained responsible for intent, political direction and selection of targets. AI reduced the amount of human labour required to turn those decisions into a functioning influence operation. The most revealing part of the case is therefore not that an Iranian propaganda network used a chatbot. It is that AI was being treated as part of the back office of information warfare – a system for converting state doctrine into apparently decentralised, multilingual and plausibly independent voices. Sources Anthropic — Detecting and countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 Iran International — Iran state-aligned accounts used Claude to push IRGC narratives https://www.iranintl.com/en/202609105561 BNE IntelliNews — Yemen missile cell used AI to write guidance software, Anthropic says https://new.intellinews.com/articles/yemen-missile-cell-used-ai-to-write-guidance-software-anthropic-says-467296 This is Beirut — Anthropic report details Iranian propaganda operations https://thisisbeirut.com.lb/news/politics/anthropic-report-details-iranian-propaganda-operations-and-yemen-missile-development-using-claude Anthropic report — PDF mirror https://static.foxbusiness.com/foxbusiness.com/content/uploads/2026/09/anthropic-detecting-and-countering-091026-1.pdf Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode11 #Iran #IranianInfluence #IranianPropaganda #CognitiveWarfare #SoftWar #JihadAlTabyin #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #SyntheticMedia #NarrativeManipulation #NarrativeLaundering #AttributionLaundering #PersonaNetworks #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #StatePropaganda #IslamicCultureAndCommunicationsOrganization #ICCO #IslamicPropagandaOrganization #KhorasanRazavi #IRGC #MultilingualInfluence #Targeting #Amplification #OSINT #WRLD
The author accused Russia of escalating its official rhetoric with open threats of war against European countries. They described Zakharova’s claims about a possible European attack as detached from reality and said they were intended to mobilise domestic audiences and prepare for potential aggression. #Russia #War #Europe #RU #EU
