After a leak of information from the CPR register, pharmacies are tightening their controls when dispensing medication, especially those with abuse potential, which may result in citizens needing to present ID or answer control questions. #CPRlæk #Apoteker #Medicinkontrol (translated)
After a leak of information from the CPR register, pharmacies will increase their vigilance when dispensing medication, especially those with potential for abuse, and can now ask control questions and require ID to ensure correct dispensing. #CPRlæk #Apoteker #Medicinkontrol (translated)
Cyberhotline extends its opening hours to assist citizens after a leak of personal sensitive information from the CPR register. (translated)
Claus Due urged readers to read an article and wrote that the state's security measures had not reacted to the fact that an otherwise legal access to the CPR register had suddenly made 8.8 million queries. He claimed that the activity had been perceived as regular use. https://t.co/S8eL8NIMPW #sikkerhed #data #CPRregister (translated)
Klaus Riskær Pedersen criticized the former and current government for the handling of the CPR register. He wrote that systematic data collection could have taken place without being stopped by the security systems and called it a political scandal that required immediate accountability. Pedersen claimed that the problems were due to Minister of Interior and Housing Christian Rabjerg Madsen awarding the operation of the CPR system to the American company DXC Technology in 2022. He also criticized former Minister Kaare Dybvad Bek, stating that the tender in 2021 was carried out under the GPA agreement, which allowed American companies to bid. According to Pedersen, the agreement allowed for the exclusion of foreign bidders on grounds of security and vital national interests, and he believed that the CPR register, which he described as critical infrastructure, should not have been entrusted to a foreign company. He placed the responsibility for the lack of control systems on the Agency for Digitization and believed that the government's leadership bore political accountability for the appointments. He wrote that Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen had not made the decision herself but had appointed a political leadership that he considered lacking in professionalism and experience. He also claimed that the government had been so preoccupied with the war in Europe by the end of 2022 that it had not concerned itself with the CPR system. Furthermore, Pedersen criticized that the Parliament, in his opinion, would choose Henrik Frandsen from the Moderates as chairman, even though Frandsen had only served in Parliament for four years. He described Frandsen as unworthy of the position and accused him of serious moral shortcomings. Pedersen wrote that all Danish citizens must remain vigilant until those responsible figured out whether new CPR numbers were necessary, suggesting that Russia would be to blame. He alleged that businesses' access to the register had been shut down, causing chaos, and that the lack of identity verification could make it difficult for public institutions to hire educators. He compared the situation to previous problems in the police's data systems. #Inkompetence #Politik #Danmark (translated)
The author said communities lost access to trusted information when a media outlet went dark. The post invited readers to join UNDRR, UNESCO and IFRC on 14 October in Geneva or online for a #DRRDay event on how supporting the media could strengthen risk communication. It included a registration link.
Disinformation for hire – the network of 70 fake newsrooms sold as a service The websites looked local. Naija Pulse appeared to cover Nigeria, Echo Berlin Germany, The British Daily Britain, Fifty States the United States and Commonwealth Post Australia. Each had its own branding, articles, supposed journalists and matching social-media presence. Taken individually, they resembled small independent news outlets. According to Anthropic, however, they were parts of a single commercial influence network spanning six continents. Anthropic’s September 2026 threat report identifies the operation as GTG-54002, a commercial “influence-as-a-service” network that used Claude to generate and rewrite political content at industrial scale. Investigators linked roughly 70 fabricated news websites to around 70 matching X accounts and more than 250 additional inauthentic commenting accounts designed to create the appearance of genuine public engagement. The network produced at least 8,913 articles in about 20 languages before Anthropic disrupted the activity. The significance of the case is not simply the number of fake sites. It is the business model. The network did not consistently promote one government, party or ideology. Anthropic found that its political position changed according to the apparent interests of different customers. The company therefore described it as a commercial influence operation: political manipulation offered in much the same way as other outsourced digital services. A fake media ecosystem built at scale Anthropic says the infrastructure was created rapidly. Domains were registered from France during a roughly ten-week period in mid-2025 and deployed through shared technical infrastructure, allowing investigators to connect publications that outwardly appeared unrelated. Most of the supporting social-media accounts were also created within a narrow timeframe in June and July 2025. The sites were designed to look like functioning local newsrooms rather than anonymous propaganda pages. Articles carried fabricated bylines belonging to journalists who, according to Anthropic, did not exist. Each outlet had a corresponding account on X, while a second layer of fake profiles commented on and amplified the articles. Many of those accounts used AI-generated profile photographs. The result was a three-tier structure: the newsroom published the story, the branded social account distributed it, and apparently ordinary users supplied the appearance of public reaction. Some of those sites remained publicly visible after the operation was exposed. The British Daily, for example, described itself as providing “conservative insights” on British sovereignty and migration, while Commonwealth Post presented itself as an Australian liberal publication focused on democracy, migration and regional security. Those contrasting editorial identities illustrate the central feature identified by Anthropic: the network was capable of taking different political positions in different markets. Claude as a publishing engine Claude was not simply asked to draft occasional articles. The operators built a structured production pipeline around it. Prompts required fixed JSON outputs, formatted HTML, precise character limits and internal links, allowing articles to move directly into an automated publishing workflow. The system could generate entirely new material or take reporting produced by legitimate journalists and rewrite it to fit a desired political perspective. Anthropic identified three recurring techniques. The same source article could be rewritten in opposite ideological directions for different audiences; a political interpretation could be added to a story that originally contained none; and material could be moved from one country to another after its original context had been removed. The articles were also structured to improve the apparent authority of the sites in search engines, helping the network imitate ordinary digital publishing practices rather than simply broadcasting propaganda. This is where generative AI changes the economics of an influence operation. A conventional network of dozens of supposedly local publications would normally require writers, translators, editors and social-media staff. Here, much of that production could be standardised and automated while human operators concentrated on political direction, customer requirements and distribution. The DRC–Rwanda conflict as a test case The clearest concentration of activity involved the Democratic Republic of Congo. Anthropic identified 318 articles concerning the DRC across the fake-news network. The material generally supported positions aligned with the Congolese government, particularly on regional mineral agreements and tensions with Rwanda. Early in the network’s growth, many of the fake social-media personas following and amplifying its accounts also presented themselves as Congolese. Investigators observed one especially revealing episode on 11 September 2025, when multiple sites published almost identical articles about the DRC–Rwanda conflict within approximately three minutes of one another. The wording and political tone were adjusted for different regional audiences, while associated X accounts distributed the links in a coordinated pattern. Anthropic said the activity contained signals suggesting that one or more customers had interests connected to the DRC–Rwanda conflict. It did not, however, identify those customers and explicitly stated that it found no evidence that any government had directed the operation. That distinction is essential. The content may have benefited a political actor without demonstrating that the actor commissioned or controlled it. Influence without ideology Commercialisation is what distinguishes GTG-54002 from many state-linked information operations. A government propaganda network usually has an identifiable strategic direction. A commercial influence provider does not need one. Its infrastructure can support one position in one country and the opposite position somewhere else, provided different customers are willing to pay. That makes attribution more difficult. Analysts cannot necessarily infer the operator from the ideology of the content because ideology may simply be part of the service package. The enduring asset is the infrastructure: domains, publishing systems, fake journalists, social-media accounts and automated amplification. Anthropic says the operation was disrupted before it achieved significant genuine reach. It classified GTG-54002 as Category Two on the Brookings Breakout Scale: material circulated across the network’s own sites and associated social accounts but showed no evidence of substantial penetration into authentic communities. Most of the 8,913 articles generated little observable engagement from real users. That limited impact is important. The case should not be presented as a successful global manipulation campaign. It is better understood as evidence that the infrastructure required to run such campaigns has become cheaper, faster and increasingly commoditised. The deeper shift is that a fake media ecosystem no longer has to be built around a single political cause. It can be built once, automated and then repurposed for the next customer. Disinformation, in this model, is no longer only a political instrument as it turend into the service. Sources: Anthropic — Countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 Business Standard — AI scaling fake newsrooms, surveillance and online scams https://www.business-standard.com/technology/tech-news/anthropic-report-ai-fake-newsrooms-dating-surveillance-scams-126091100730_1.html Mimikama — KI baut 70 erfundene Nachrichtenportale https://www.mimikama.org/ki-netzwerk-erfundene-nachrichtenportale-echo-berlin/ Poliscoop Media — Anthropic exposes DRC propaganda network https://www.poliscoopmedia.com/articles/anthropic-exposes-drc-propaganda-network-20260911 The British Daily — example of a fabricated outlet identified in the network https://www.british-daily.com/contact Commonwealth Post — example of a fabricated outlet identified in the network https://commonwealth-post.com/category/science MalPulse — infrastructure references for network domains https://www.malpulse.com/infra-pivots/usom-pivots/list/?page=1105 Keywords: #DISINFORMED #Episode13 #DisinformationAsAService #InfluenceAsAService #FakeNewsrooms #FakeMedia #SyntheticMedia #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #Disinformation #InfluenceOperations #InformationWarfare #FIMI #CommercialInfluence #PoliticalManipulation #NarrativeManipulation #NarrativeLaundering #SourceLaundering #MediaImpersonation #FakeJournalists #SyntheticPersonas #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #CoordinatedInauthenticBehaviour #CIB #DigitalInfluence #AutomatedPropaganda #ContentAutomation #AIPropaganda #LKMCompany #NaijaPulse #AxumVoices #JamboJournal #EchoBerlin #TheBritishDaily #FiftyStates #CommonwealthPost #DRC #Rwanda #OSINT #WRLD
Starting in 2029, a water management register will be introduced in Austria to systematically record large water extractions, which, however, is criticized by environmental organizations due to the high thresholds and late start. #Wasserentnahme #Klimawandel #Digitalisierung (translated)
A voter mobilisation campaign has registered huge numbers of young people but it is not clear who they are backing. #GenZPolitics #YouthEmpowerment #KenyaElection2027
The author welcomed progress by the Council of Europe, saying the Register of Damage for Ukraine had opened all 43 categories for claims related to damage caused by Russia in Ukraine. They wrote that Russia’s aggression had caused devastation across many aspects of life, including loss of life and destruction of homes. #Ukraine #Russia #Claims #RU #UA
A mandatory professional register for real estate agents must counteract fraudulent practices in the real estate sector by binding them to codes of conduct and subjecting them to an independent dispute committee. #makelaars #woningmarkt #register (translated)
UD OCH SVENSK AMBASSAD HJÄLPTE ILYAS HASSAN KRINGGÅ REGLERNA FÖR EKONOMISK ERSÄTTNING Vänsterpartiets Mohamed Ali som slipper betala av skulder är inte ensam om att ha getts ekonomisk gräddfil av Landet Lagom. 2014 uppgav röstfuskutpekade partikollegan ILYAS HASSAN att hans pappa som bodde i Somalia gått bort i hjärtinfarkt i Mogadishu, något som Hassan ville ha ekonomisk ersättning av Sverige för. Hassan skrev bl.a. brev till dåvarande utrikesminister Carl Bildt. Sveriges policy var att inte godta dokument från Somalia som bevis, då landet bl.a. saknade förvaltning, regering och centrala register. Ilyas Hassan säger dock i SR 2015 att "Vi hade kontakter hos Utrikesdepartementet och svenska ambassaden i Nairobi". Ambassadören i fråga ska ha varit @JBorgstam. Enligt Hassan författade ambassadören ett speciellt brev, vilket ledde till att undantag kunde göras av Skatteverket som då kunde betala Ilyas Hassans klan. https://t.co/GDceLy9oxV #Sverige #EkonomiskErsättning #Vänsterpartiet
Wir können kein Land sein, in dem Menschen einfach zu Waffen greifen und wahllos auf andere Menschen schießen. Dem muss ein Ende gesetzt werden, und wir werden die notwendigen Maßnahmen ergreifen.Präsident Cyril Ramaphosa zeigte sich angesichts der Gewalttaten am Wochenende erschüttert und verspricht, "alle Register zu ziehen", um die Kriminalität zu senken. #Südafrika #Kriminalität #Gewalt
Präsident Ramaphosa kündigte an, alle Register zu ziehen, um der Gewalt in Südafrika entgegenzuwirken, nachdem am Wochenende mindestens 28 Menschen durch Schusswaffen gestorben sind und die Polizei mit einer Vertrauenskrise konfrontiert ist. #Südafrika #Kriminalität #Gewalt
🔴Över 100 anställda inom äldreomsorgen i Växjö är dömda Över 100 anställda inom äldreomsorgen i Växjö kommun har en eller flera domar i belastningsregistret, enligt en granskning av Smålandsposten. Totalt handlar det om 164 domar. Bland brotten finns sexualbrott, däribland våldtäkt mot barn. En av de anställda är alltså dömd för våldtäkt mot barn och arbetar samtidigt inom äldreomsorgen. Detta trots att Växjö kommun uppger att registerutdrag ska begäras vid nyanställningar inom omsorgsförvaltningen. Sedan den 1 mars 2026 har kommuner dessutom rätt att begära utdrag ur både belastningsregistret och misstankeregistret vid anställningar inom äldreomsorg och hemtjänst. Frågan är hur personer med tidigare domar har kunnat hamna i verksamheten och vilka kontroller som faktiskt har genomförts. Källa: Smålandsposten #äldreomsorg #Växjö #brottslingar
Fake NV – how a cloned newsroom turned an AI video into a $140 million corruption scandal For two days in September, a website that looked almost indistinguishable from one of Ukraine’s best-known news organisations carried an extraordinary corruption story. It claimed that Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau had raided former defence procurement chief Arsen Zhumadilov and discovered more than $140 million in cash packed inside refrigerator boxes. One box supposedly carried the words “For the Servant of the People” – an apparent reference to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s political party. The raid never happened. The photographs and video presented as evidence were fabricated, and the news organisation reporting the story was not the New Voice of Ukraine but a cloned version of it. The episode is a compact example of an increasingly effective disinformation technique. Rather than inventing a new propaganda outlet and trying to build its credibility from scratch, an operator can simply steal the identity of an established newsroom and place fabricated material inside an otherwise convincing copy of its editorial environment. A newsroom copied almost in full The counterfeit site appeared at nvukraine.com, while the authentic New Voice of Ukraine operates at nv.ua and english.nv.ua. Registration records examined by fact-checkers show that the false domain was created on 21 September 2026, two days before the fabricated article appeared. According to NV’s own investigation, the imitation went much further than copying a logo: the operators reproduced the site’s visual design, sections, branding, contact information and genuine editorial material. A snapshot of legitimate NV content from 23 September appears to have been copied onto the counterfeit site, into which the operators inserted a single false article. That article claimed that NABU had searched premises connected to Zhumadilov, who had headed Ukraine’s Defence Procurement Agency until August, and seized $140 million in cash. The story was published in several languages, including Ukrainian and English, suggesting that the operation was intended not only for Ukraine’s domestic information space but also for foreign audiences following the war and Western support for Kyiv. AI supplied the supposed evidence The false article was supported by a video purportedly showing the money discovered during the raid. NABU said no such search or procedural action had taken place and identified the footage as fabricated using artificial intelligence. Independent fact-checker Lead Stories found no credible Ukrainian or international reporting confirming either the raid or the alleged seizure, while searches of NABU’s own published material produced no evidence supporting the claim. The operation therefore combined two separate forms of synthetic credibility. The AI-generated footage supplied what looked like visual proof, while the cloned NV website supplied institutional proof: an apparently reputable Ukrainian newsroom supposedly confirming that the event had happened. Neither element needed to withstand close scrutiny for long. Together, they only needed to appear credible enough to be copied, quoted and redistributed before the deception was exposed. From a fake Ukrainian source into the Russian information ecosystem On 24 September, the story began moving through large pro-Russian Telegram channels. Ukraine’s Center for Strategic Communications traced early amplification to Golos Mordora, with roughly 149,000 subscribers, and Militarist, with around 277,000. Within less than an hour, other channels including VOBLA, Rossiya Seychas and Ostashko! Vazhnoye were circulating versions of the same claim. It subsequently appeared on X and on Russian-language websites including e-news.su and pressa24.ru. Babel calculated that posts carrying the fabrication had accumulated approximately 370,000 views by the morning of 25 September. The story also moved beyond the Russian-language ecosystem. English-language versions appeared in online communities including Lemmy and Hexbear, while accounts on X shared direct links to the counterfeit NV article. NV later reported that larger Russian media and propaganda outlets, including RIA Novosti, Life, Vesti, Ukraina.ru and Mail.ru, had reproduced or discussed the claim. Kirill Dmitriev, head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund and a Kremlin representative involved in contacts with the United States, also shared it on 25 September. This amplification is significant, but it should not be confused with proof of authorship. Publicly available evidence shows how the false story entered and spread through a Russian and pro-Russian information ecosystem. It does not establish which organisation registered the cloned domain, generated the video or directed the operation from the outset. Why copy NV? The operation relied on source laundering. A claim originating directly from a Russian Telegram channel that Ukraine’s defence procurement system had concealed $140 million would immediately carry an obvious political context. A claim apparently uncovered by an established Ukrainian newsroom looks very different. Once the fabricated NV article existed, subsequent accounts could cite what appeared to be an independent Ukrainian source rather than present the allegation as their own. Each repost moved the story another step away from its manufactured origin. The use of an English-language version strengthened that mechanism for audiences outside Ukraine. The underlying narrative was also carefully chosen. Corruption in Ukrainian defence procurement is a genuine subject of public scrutiny and investigative reporting, so the fabricated story did not require audiences to accept an entirely unfamiliar premise. It inserted a false event into a real area of political concern. That mixture of authentic context and fabricated evidence can be more persuasive than a completely invented story because much of the surrounding information feels recognisable. What can – and cannot – be attributed Ukrainian authorities and NV describe the episode as a Russian information operation, and its distribution can be documented extensively across pro-Russian and Russian media channels. The available public evidence, however, does not identify the organisation that created the counterfeit website, nor does it link the operation forensically to a named Russian intelligence service, military unit or state contractor. The most precise description is therefore a Russian-aligned disinformation operation whose fabricated material was systematically amplified through the Russian information ecosystem. That distinction matters. Distribution can be observed directly; command-and-control is harder to establish and should not be inferred without evidence. The newsroom itself becomes the deepfake The most important feature of the operation was not the $140 million figure or even the AI-generated video. It was the counterfeit newsroom surrounding them. The operators copied a real publication, populated it largely with genuine material and inserted a single false story, allowing the fabrication to borrow the accumulated credibility of journalists who had nothing to do with it. This points to a broader evolution in synthetic media. AI can fabricate an image, a voice or a video, but an influence operation can now fabricate something larger: the source that supposedly verified the evidence. In the Fake NV operation, the article, the video and the website reinforced one another, creating not simply a false story but a manufactured chain of credibility. Sources The New Voice of Ukraine — investigation into the cloned website https://english.nv.ua/nation/nv-discovers-fake-copy-of-website-with-planted-story-cites-russian-links-50644601.html The New Voice of Ukraine — Russian amplification of the $140 million fabrication https://english.nv.ua/russia-spreads-fake-140-million-ukraine-corruption-story-during-dmitriev-u-s-talks-50644647.html Lead Stories — independent fact-check https://leadstories.com/hoax-alert/2026/09/fact-check-fake-story-claims-140-million-found-at-home-of-ukraines-zhumadilov-marked-servant-of-the-people-nv-website-originated-it.html Babel — AI video and distribution analysis https://babel.ua/en/news/130469-a-video-is-sharing-online-about-140-million-found-in-the-possession-of-the-ex-head-of-the-defense-procurement-agency-this-is-an-ai-video-distributed-by-a-clone-of-ukrainian-media Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security — initial debunk https://spravdi.org/en/ai-fake-about-140-million-amid-us-talks-how-russians-impose-the-image-of-corrupt-ukraine-on-the-west/ Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security — NABU confirmation https://spravdi.org/u-merezhi-poshyryuyut-shi-fejk-pro-nibyto-obshuky-nabu-v-eksgolovy-agencziyi-oboronnyh-zakupivel/ Detector Media — distribution and NABU response https://detector.media/infospace/article/252806/2026-09-25-u-merezhi-pidrobyly-sayt-nv-dlya-poshyrennya-feyku-pro-obshuky-v-eksochilnyka-agentsii-oboronnykh-zakupivel/ Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode10 #FakeNV #NewVoiceOfUkraine #Ukraine #Russia #RussianDisinformation #RussianInfluence #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #MediaImpersonation #ClonedMedia #FakeMedia #FakeNews #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIGeneratedContent #SyntheticMedia #AIVideo #SourceLaundering #NarrativeLaundering #CorruptionNarrative #UkraineCorruption #DefenceProcurement #NABU #ArsenZhumadilov #Telegram #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #Propaganda #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD
Somaligate! Företaget ”AfriTech GrowTh AB” bildades 1987, men nu är den enda styrelseledamoten Mohamed Abdukadir Ali, tydligen ett s.k. lagerbolag som Mohammad Ali inför sin storslagna affärsidé att sälja bank ID system till Somalia, köpt. Adressen går till Agneta Nyvalls privata adress. Årsredovisning finns men ina tillgångar, ingen omsättning finns. Siffror på detta bolag är 0 kr Expressen skriver: ”Samtidigt har han gjort flera affärsresor till Somalia för att sälja in ett projekt till landets reformprogram som delfinansieras genom ett ifrågasatt avtal med den svenska regeringen.” Företaget är registeraret varken för moms, F-skatt eller för arbetsgivaravgifter. Företaget verksamhet handlar om ”att bidra med tekniska lösningar och ny teknik för hållbar statsutveckling i afrikanska länder, som stödjer ett mer rättvist, effektivt och långsiktigt hållbart statsskick.” Således mycket stora ambitioner. Detta bolag ingår dessutom i ” Nyvalls IT Partner AB”, det vill säga Agnetas bolag, hon som i klippet beskriver sin kompanjons obefintliga gärningar. Även Agnetas bolag ser inte ut att ha bedrivit någon versaksent alls de senaste sex åren. Även i hennes bolag är samtliga siffror 0 kr. Allt detta har tydligen varit ett upplägg att roffa åt sig Sida-pengar, precis samma upplägg som förekommer i USA, av en del somaliska medborgare. #Somalia #Korruption #Affärer
In #Düsseldorf fand heute eine Demo statt, zu der bundesweit von pro-islamistischen aufgerufen wurde. Auch solche Schmückstücke mit Hamas-Stirnband waren auf der Demo anwesend. Das Stirnband wird vom Anzeige-Register als Symbol der Hamas aufgeführt. https://t.co/YfCK6fIHw0 #Düsseldorf #Demo #Hamas
No victims in any category below have been double-counted. Outside Peru, no war-related deaths or imprisonments have been included. Communism vs. Villagers 400,000 dead — Cambodian rural (1) 19.5 million dead — Chinese peasants (2) 250,000 dead — Ethiopian nomads (3) 5 million dead — Soviet peasants (4) 340,000 dead — Tibetan rural (5) Communism vs. Landowners 3 million dead — Chinese landowners (6) 100,000 dead — Vietnamese landowners (8) Note: Soviet kulaks are counted among the villagers. Communism vs. Religion 47,000 dead — Cambodian Buddhists (9) 13,000 imprisoned — Czech priests / religious (10) 7,000 imprisoned — Mozambican Jehovah’s Witnesses (11) 100,000 imprisoned — North Korean Christians (12) 2,100 imprisoned — Polish priests & Jehovah’s Witnesses (13) 200,000 dead — Soviet clergy (15) 2,000 dead — Tibetan monks & pilgrims (18) 400 dead — Romanian Christians (14) Moreover, Christians suffered the following in Romanian prison: In a “baptism of immersion,” inmates’ heads were plunged into buckets of urine and feces, while guards chanted baptismal rites. Near the point of drowning the Christian’s head was let up for air and then plunged back into the sewage (65). Communism vs. Cossacks 400,000 dead or deported ethnics (20) Photo: Bolshevik instructions on “the need to do away with the cossacks.” (21) “Order no.7: In the event of an unauthorized exit of a registered [Cossack] family, the family shall be shot.” “Order no. 8: This execution shall be carried out among every family member.” “Order no. 9: All property of the executed [Cossack] shall be confiscated and given to the poor.” Communism vs. Native Americans 6,000 dead — Ashaninka (Peru/luminoso-22) 5,000 imprisoned — Ashaninka (Peru/luminoso-22) 10,000 forcibly relocated — Ashaninka (Peru/luminoso-22) 35 destroyed — Ashaninka communities (Peru/luminoso-22) 35,000 imprisoned or forcibly relocated — Nicaraguan tribesmen (Sandinistas-23) Communism vs. Unclassified Dissidents* 5,000 dead — Albanian dissidents (24) 10,000 dead — Angolan dissidents (25) 29,000 dead — Bulgarian dissidents (26) 1 million dead — Cambodian dissidents (27) 43 million dead — Chinese dissidents (28) 16,000 dead — Cuban dissidents (29) Moreover, in Cuba’s concentration camps, inmates faced the following “punishments.” They were forced to “cut grass with their teeth,” endure “mock executions,” live in iron cages “1 meter wide, 1.8 meters high,” sit for hours in toilet ditches, withstand shock treatment, die by the hundreds from starvation and lack of medical attention (30). 44,000 dead — East German dissidents (31) 10,000 dead — Ethiopian dissidents (32) 50,000 dead — Hungarian dissidents (33) 3,000 dead — Nicaraguan dissidents (34) Moreover, 11,000 Nicaraguans were tortured at the hands of the Sandinistas. This included their being skinned alive & then executed; drawn & quartered; forced to watch wives and daughters sexually assaulted; caged in cubicles less than a square meter; “punished” via electric shock; deprived food and water (35). 1.6 million dead — North Korean dissidents (36) 21,857 dead — Polish dissidents (37) 120,000 dead — Romanian dissidents (38) 8 million dead — Soviet dissidents (39) 425,000 dead — Tibetan dissidents (40) Moreover, Tibetans suffered the following atrocities at the hands of the Chinese. They faced: crucifixion drowning beheading boiling alive burying alive mutilation (41) Communism vs. Gay Rights 25,000 imprisoned — Cuban gays and other “deviants” (42) 500 dead — Peruvian gays, bisexuals, and transgendered (43) 11,000 arrested — Polish gays (44) 100,000s imprisoned — Soviet gays in slave labor camps (45) Moreover, Chinese gays were targeted for persecution although numbers are impossible to quantify (46). Communism vs. Collective Laborers 160 dead — East German strikers (47) demonstrators killed after protesting a 10% increase in work quotas. 110 dead — Nicaraguan strikers executed by the Sandinistas after demanding back pay (48). 31 dead — Novocherkassk strikers (Kruschev) 24 killed on the spot; 7 later executed; over 100 workers arrested. (49) 51 dead — Peruvian union leaders (50) 106 dead — Polish strikers Poznan demonstrators killed after protesting working conditions & pay issues; others killed in later strikes; thousands attacked by military (51). 3,000 dead — Soviet strikers (Lenin / Trotsky) some shot / others, as N. Werth describes, “loaded onto barges and then thrown by the hundreds into the Volga with stones around their necks” (52). Moreover; Massive factory protests in China — strikers beaten back by 30,000 red soldiers after disputing wages (53). Striking outlawed in Cuba (54). Organizers sentenced to as many as 26 years in prison (55).
Die 39-jährige Türkin Zeynep Can soll mit ihrem Pflegedienst mutmaßlich 11 Millionen Euro Schaden verursacht haben. Die Firma Weiße Engel Intensivpflege GmbH in Düsseldorf ist erst seit 2023 im Register.Vorwurf: Intensivpflege abgerechnet, die nicht oder nur teilweise erbracht wurde – teils mit unqualifiziertem Personal. Bei einer Razzia fanden Beamte in einer Wohnung ein pflegebedürftiges Kind in Lebensgefahr. Sichergestellt wurden unter anderem lila Lamborghini, Maybach, AMG, 265.000 € Schmuck, 140.000 € Uhren und 51.000 € Bargeld. Can und ihr Mann sitzen in U-Haft. #Pflege #Betrug #Düsseldorf
