Two Ryanair flights from Dublin were searched at Rome's Fiumicino airport after separate anonymous bomb threats, but both were deemed safe following exhaustive inspections. #Ryanair #BombThreats #AviationSafety

THE “BATTLE OF CERIGNOLA (1503)” ON “POPULAR ARCHAEOLOGY USA” (by LUCIANO MAGALDI SARDELLA) SOURCE 1: https://popular-archaeology.com/author/sardella/ SOURCE 2: https://popular-archaeology.com/article/the-2026-battlefield-archaeology-of-the-battle-of-cerignola-1503/ __________________________________________________________________ CERIGNOLA (FG) — On 28 April 1503, at sunset, a shallow trench cut through the vineyards outside Cerignola rendered heavy cavalry obsolete. For five centuries its exact position has been merely conjectured, its archaeology ignored, its most important sources never translated into English. We are on the Puglian Tablelanda, a corridor of battles for two thousand years: from Cannae in 216 BC to Frederick II’s falconry from Torre Alemanna. Cerignola, at that time, was not a town but a rural hamlet of 350 families at 120 metres above sea level, guardian of the Mena of the Dogana delle Pecore, the great customs system of transhumance that financed the Kingdom of Naples. It was for its possession that the battle was fought. Opposed, two worlds. Louis d’Armagnac, Duke of Nemours, Viceroy of Naples for Louis XII, thirty years old, splendidly armed, certain of victory. On the other side, Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba, the Great Captain, who on 27–28 April marches from Barletta with some 9,000 exhausted men and decides to entrench himself upon a low ridge. In front of it he has deepened what was already there: not an invention, but an agrarian ditch. The French gendarmes, the last heirs of the mediaeval knight, lower their lances and never reach the line. From behind an embankment reinforced with vine stakes, more than 1,000 Spanish arquebusiers open fire. Nemours falls, almost certainly the first European army commander to die by a portable firearm. With him dies the cavalry charge as a dominant tactic. And here lies the scandal denounced by the article: no cartographer of the seventeenth or eighteenth century ever mapped the field. No memorial stone recalls it. It is not protected as a cultural landscape under the Code of Cultural Heritage. Every deep ploughing of the Tavoliere, standard practice since the Bourbon reforms, destroys an archaeology never recorded. Yet the perimeter is reconstructable. By cross-referencing sixteenth-century descriptions of “slopes covered with vineyards fifteen miles north of the Ofanto” with the Via Traiana, the engagement zone is a rectangle of 3–4 sq km to the north-east of the present settlement. With ISPRA’s 1m DTM LiDAR, anomalous linear depressions could be revealed, and the lower fill of a 2–3 metre ditch, beneath the ploughed layer, is still legible by magnetometry and ground-penetrating radar. Why have we arrived so late? Not for lack of sources, but for lack of translation. The Comune di Cerignola and the Centro Studi e Ricerche Torre Alemanna of Prof. Matteo Stuppiello, who in 1978 obtained the first monumental protection for Torre Alemanna, have digitised a corpus that has never entered Anglophone historiography. Here are the 3 pillars: 1. The letter that still smells of powder. The “Letter of Consalvo da Cordova to the Sovereigns of Spain of 29 April 1503,” edited by Stuppiello in 2003 and updated in 2025 on comune.cerignola.fg.it/biblioteche-digitali. A manuscript page written at Cerignola the day after the battle, “rich in flashes, twilight gleams, and gunfire.” Not a polished chronicle à la Giovio, but a field dispatch: the exhaustion of the night march, the decision to entrench upon arrival, the recovery and honourable burial of Nemours, the intact capture of the French artillery. 2. The graffito, a monument within the monument. In the fourteenth-century church of Santa Maria delle Grazie, known as the Incoronatella, on the Via Trinitapoli Vecchia, where tradition holds the body of Nemours was taken. On the triumphal arch, a graffito of 1503 gives in quasi-notarial form the date, sixth indiction, Friday at the twenty-third to twenty-fourth hour. It truly was a Friday, as confirmed by Cappelli’s perpetual calendar. Deciphered in 1995 by Prof. Francesco Magistrale, Latin palaeographer at the University of Bari, in La Battaglia di Cerignola (1993) and in the municipal monograph S.M. delle Grazie (1999). It is now fading through damp and neglect. 3. The cadastre that explains the ditch. The Apprezzo of 1672 preserved in the Archivio di Stato di Napoli, fondo Pignatelli Aragona Cortes, Scanzia 63, fasc.1: “At the time of the battle, dense vineyards covered the hill reaching down to the plain, and were clearly separated from the rest of the countryside by a not very deep ditch”. Córdoba did not improvise; he adapted. This is confirmed by the Giustiniani cadastres: 277 hearths in 1532, 699 in 1595. The landscape of 1503 was one of intensive horticulture, not the deep-ploughed cereal monoculture of today. To these are added the first monograph by Vincenzo Buonassisi, La Battaglia di Cerignola (1908, died at Via Fanfulla 10 on 27 June 1928), and the first modern military analysis by Piero Pieri, “Consalvo di Cordova e la battaglia di Cerignola”, Archivio Storico Pugliese 1952, which 30 years before the Anglophone rediscovery of “pike-and-shot” defined Cerignola as an engineered killing ground. While Cerignola forgot, others remembered. The “Regimiento de Infantería Cerinola n.42”, later “Fuerteventura n.56”, bore the name of Cerignola until the twentieth century. Its coat of arms, described in Heráldica e Historiales del Ejército, Tomo V (Madrid, 1981): argent field, a dying white swan entangled in a hedge, a gold mural crown, with scroll “Cerignola”. Dossier officially transmitted on 30 April 1986, prot. 4565/509, by the Servicio Histórico Militar in Madrid to the Centro Torre Alemanna through Col. Alessio Antonutti and Gen. José Cifuentes. And in Amsterdam, in the Rijksmuseum, the anonymous commemorative bronze medal: Hercules with lion-skin and club and Janus with keys beside an eagled coat of arms, legend “Consalvus Agidarius… Janum clausit”, on the reverse a battle scene “Consalvi Agidari Victoria de Gallis ad Cannas” — an error by the artist who confuses Cerignola with Cannae. It belonged to Mrs J.M. van Gelder-Nijhoff, donated in 1885. The author’s conclusion is unequivocal: Gonzalo’s ditch is the most consequential earthwork in European military history. It inaugurates the infantryman armed with a firearm and conditions the Mediterranean for 160 years. It may still be there, infilled, ploughed over, invisible to the naked eye but accessible to a magnetometer. It is not a question of mediaeval archaeology but of the will to protect.
The author called for SPAK to investigate allegations described in reports published by JOQ Albania and Gazeta Telegraf on 20 October 2026. According to the post, the claims came from an anonymous person who identified as a police officer. The author also raised the question of who “Belinda’s men” were. https://t.co/emMDBERcdh #Albania #Investigation #Corruption #AL
𝗨𝗻𝗶𝘁𝗲𝗱 𝗦𝘁𝗮𝘁𝗲𝘀 — 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗶𝗻𝗳𝗹𝘂𝗲𝗻𝗰𝗲 𝗻𝗲𝘁𝘄𝗼𝗿𝗸 𝗯𝘂𝗶𝗹𝘁 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗔𝗜, 𝗻𝗼𝘁 𝘃𝗼𝘁𝗲𝗿𝘀 A newly exposed US political influence network appears to have been designed around a different target from most election propaganda. Its primary audience was not necessarily the voter reading a website, but the automated systems that search the web on behalf of AI chatbots. Threat-intelligence company VisionHeight initially identified 37 anonymous websites presenting themselves as state or local news organisations, opinion publications and national issue sites. By 15 October, the company's co-founder and chief technology officer, Nitsan Daniel, told CyberScoop that the investigation had expanded the observed footprint to 𝗮𝘁 𝗹𝗲𝗮𝘀𝘁 𝟭𝟰 𝗨𝗦 𝘀𝘁𝗮𝘁𝗲𝘀 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝟰𝟲𝟬 𝗽𝗮𝗴𝗲𝘀. The states identified were Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia and Wisconsin. The infrastructure shows unusually strong signs of coordination. All 37 domains in the original dataset were registered during a single evening; 36 were registered within approximately eight minutes. On 30 September alone, the network published roughly 𝟭𝟬𝟬,𝟬𝟬𝟬 𝘄𝗼𝗿𝗱𝘀 𝗼𝗳 𝗰𝗮𝗻𝗱𝗶𝗱𝗮𝘁𝗲-𝗿𝗲𝗹𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗱 𝗺𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗶𝗮𝗹 using common templates and four recurring layouts. VisionHeight assesses that the scale and production pattern strongly suggest extensive automation, although that does not by itself prove which generative-AI system, if any, produced the text. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗶𝘀 𝘀𝘁𝗿𝘂𝗰𝘁𝘂𝗿𝗲𝗱 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗺𝗮𝗰𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗲 𝗿𝗲𝘁𝗿𝗶𝗲𝘃𝗮𝗹. Candidate profiles can run to about 5,000 words, accompanied by similarly long voter guides containing 50 to 63 questions phrased in the style of queries someone might put to an AI assistant. Across the network, formulations such as a candidate being “the stronger choice” were repeated hundreds of times. One profile contained the phrase 34 times. In several voter guides examined by VisionHeight, the favoured candidate was named more than 110 times while an opponent appeared only six or seven times. The websites were also configured to make themselves unusually accessible to AI. Their crawler instructions explicitly welcomed 17 automated systems associated with companies including OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Perplexity, Meta, Amazon and Apple. Some pages were marked in machine-readable metadata as news articles, while apparently separate publications cited one another. The result is a manufactured ecosystem in which several apparently independent local sources can reinforce the same conclusion. That is the central technique. 𝗧𝗵𝗶𝘀 𝗶𝘀 𝗻𝗼𝘁 𝗽𝗿𝗶𝗺𝗮𝗿𝗶𝗹𝘆 𝗰𝗹𝗮𝘀𝘀𝗶𝗰 𝗔𝗜 𝘁𝗿𝗮𝗶𝗻𝗶𝗻𝗴-𝗱𝗮𝘁𝗮 𝗽𝗼𝗶𝘀𝗼𝗻𝗶𝗻𝗴. The more immediate objective appears to be manipulation of the retrieval and search layer: place highly optimised material online, make it easy for automated crawlers to index, create the appearance of corroboration, and increase the chance that an AI assistant retrieves those pages when answering a political question. There is evidence that the network crossed that boundary. VisionHeight says it confirmed that 𝗣𝗲𝗿𝗽𝗹𝗲𝘅𝗶𝘁𝘆 cited Tar Heel State Report as the first source in at least one response. Separately, one of the network's candidate pages reached third place in a Google search six days after publication, above Ballotpedia for the tested query. These findings demonstrate that the material can enter AI-relevant search and retrieval pipelines. They do 𝗻𝗼𝘁 demonstrate that the operation changed anyone's vote, nor establish how frequently major chatbots have used the network. The timing matters because AI has become part of the election-information environment. An AAPC Foundation survey of 1,568 likely US voters found that about one in five planned to use AI to investigate a race on their ballot, while 38 per cent reported having received election information through an AI-generated search summary. A separate NewsGuard audit found that leading chatbots frequently cited partisan websites disguised as local journalism without clearly identifying their political affiliations. The newly identified network appears to take that existing vulnerability one step further by constructing content specifically around the way machines search and summarise information. 𝗪𝗵𝗼 𝗶𝘀 𝗯𝗲𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗱 𝗶𝘁? 𝗔𝘁 𝗽𝗿𝗲𝘀𝗲𝗻𝘁, 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗿𝗲 𝗶𝘀 𝗻𝗼 𝗱𝗲𝗳𝗲𝗻𝘀𝗶𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝗮𝗻𝘀𝘄𝗲𝗿. VisionHeight has not attributed the operation to any individual, campaign, company, political party or foreign government. No confirmed name of an operator has been publicly established. Nitsan Daniel is the researcher who helped expose the network, not a person connected to its operation. Some components have explicitly partisan branding. VisionHeight's indicators include domains such as Affordability Democrats, Democratic Women House, Public Safety Democrats and Republican Incumbent Watch, while the live Affordability Democrats site promotes Democratic candidates across 11 competitive House races. That provides evidence about the political direction of some of the published material, but it does 𝗻𝗼𝘁 establish who commissioned, financed or operated the infrastructure, and it would be unjustified to attribute it to the Democratic Party or any particular campaign. The network also appears broader than congressional politics. The live Tar Heel State Report has carried material on county commission and judicial contests, illustrating why the method may be particularly effective in down-ballot races where established local reporting is thin. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝘀𝗶𝗴𝗻𝗶𝗳𝗶𝗰𝗮𝗻𝗰𝗲 𝗼𝗳 𝘁𝗵𝗶𝘀 𝗼𝗽𝗲𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗶𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗮𝘁𝘁𝗮𝗰𝗸 𝘀𝘂𝗿𝗳𝗮𝗰𝗲. Propaganda no longer has to persuade a human being directly. It can instead attempt to shape the information environment from which an apparently neutral machine constructs its answer. 𝗦𝗧𝗔𝗧𝗨𝗦: Active / newly exposed and expanding as of 15–16 October 2026. 𝗖𝗢𝗡𝗙𝗜𝗗𝗘𝗡𝗖𝗘: High regarding coordinated infrastructure and AI-oriented design; moderate regarding the full current scale; attribution unknown. 𝗦𝗢𝗨𝗥𝗖𝗘𝗦 VisionHeight — primary investigation, “Someone Is Manipulating Your AI to Swing Your Vote” https://www.visionheight.com/resources/someone-is-manipulating-your-ai-to-swing-your-vote CyberScoop — Derek B. Johnson, 15 October 2026 https://cyberscoop.com/ai-chatbots-election-influence-hyperlocal-networks/ Tar Heel State Report — live network site used for OSINT verification https://tarheelstatereport.com/ Affordability Democrats — live network site https://affordabilitydemocrats.com/ AAPC Foundation — 2026 AI Voter Study https://theaapc.org/release-foundation-research/ NPR — reporting on voters using AI chatbots for the 2026 midterms https://www.wusf.org/2026-10-05/people-are-asking-chatgpt-to-help-them-decide-how-to-vote-in-the-midterms NewsGuard — “Pink Slime Is Infecting AI Chatbots Ahead of the Midterms” https://www.newsguardtech.com/press/pink-slime-is-infecting-ai-chatbots-ahead-of-the-midterms/ 𝗞𝗘𝗬𝗪𝗢𝗥𝗗𝗦 #Disinformed #Disinformation #Propaganda #InfluenceOperations #AI #ArtificialIntelligence #AIChatbots #ElectionSecurity #USMidterms #USElections #InformationWarfare #CognitiveWarfare #OSINT #ThreatIntelligence #CyberSecurity #DataPoisoning #RetrievalManipulation #SearchManipulation #GenerativeAI #LLM #AIManipulation #PoliticalInfluence #FakeNews #LocalNews #PinkSlime #Perplexity #ElectionIntegrity #InformationIntegrity #DigitalPropaganda #AIsecurity
Tafouk TV – how three Sahel military governments are building a common information system Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger are no longer relying only on speeches, social media or their existing national broadcasters to shape the information environment around the Alliance of Sahel States. They are building a shared, permanent media infrastructure. At its centre is Tafouk TV, the confederal television channel of the AES, broadcasting from Bamako. Its creation was formally agreed by the three governments in December 2025, its governing structure was installed in 2026 and regular programming began in September. The project is explicitly presented by AES authorities as an instrument of “information sovereignty” and what Malian Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop has called “narrative sovereignty”. A television channel built by three military governments Tafouk TV is fundamentally different from a covert bot network or a collection of anonymous propaganda accounts. Its ownership and political purpose are public. It is an institutional broadcaster created by the governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, all currently led by military authorities. Malian government documents describe the channel as a common media instrument intended to strengthen communication across the confederation, promote regional identities and respond to what the AES sees as hostile narratives and disinformation. The project sits alongside Daandè Liptako, a shared radio service, and broader plans to develop common information structures across the three states. That institutional architecture is important. A social-media influence network can disappear when accounts are suspended. A television channel, radio network and future news agency can develop journalists, archives, correspondents, distribution agreements and continuous daily output. The result is not a temporary campaign but potentially a long-term information system. Russia enters through RT The Russian connection is also public. In July 2026, Tafouk TV signed a cooperation agreement with RT, the Russian state-funded international broadcaster. The memorandum was signed by Tafouk TV director-general Salif Sanogo and Natalia Lebedeva, director of RT en français. It provides for content exchange, expertise-sharing and joint coverage of major events in Russia and the Sahel. RT described itself as Tafouk TV's first international partner. This makes Tafouk part of a much broader geopolitical realignment in the Sahel. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have reduced cooperation with France and other Western partners while deepening political, diplomatic and security relations with Moscow. But the distinction is important: there is no public evidence that Russia owns Tafouk TV, finances the entire channel or directly controls its editorial decisions. The most precise description is therefore a state-owned AES broadcaster with a formal partnership with Russian state media, rather than a Russian-controlled television station. The battle over the narrative AES officials make little attempt to hide the strategic role they expect the channel to play. During a visit to Tafouk TV shortly after regular broadcasting began, Abdoulaye Diop described communication as another strategic front alongside defence, diplomacy and development. He spoke of a geopolitical environment characterised by a “war of narratives” and said the AES needed its own media to defend its interests and strengthen its narrative sovereignty. Mali's government has similarly described Tafouk TV as an instrument of information sovereignty, regional cohesion and Sahelian identity. The first governing-board meetings emphasised digital distribution, national languages and the creation of a new generation of Sahelian journalists capable of carrying the confederation's message at home and abroad. Early reporting examined by the Financial Times found patriotic programming, interviews with officials and positive reporting from conflict zones. The newspaper described the project in the context of the three governments' attempts to challenge Western media narratives and strengthen their legitimacy while facing continuing jihadist insurgencies. Why this is not simply another disinformation operation It is important not to use propaganda and disinformation as synonyms. A state broadcaster can systematically promote the government's preferred interpretation of events without every story being false.Tafouk TV's significance therefore lies less in individual fabricated claims than in the information architecture being created around it: three governments operating a shared broadcaster, common radio infrastructure and potentially other confederal media, while cooperating with Russia's international state-media system. This development is taking place while independent media conditions across the three countries are deteriorating. Reporters Without Borders ranked Burkina Faso 110th, Niger 120th and Mali 121st in its 2026 World Press Freedom Index, pointing to arbitrary detentions, restrictions on journalists and suspensions of media outlets across the AES states. That context changes the importance of Tafouk TV. A new state broadcaster entering a diverse and competitive media environment is one thing. A common government-controlled broadcaster expanding while alternative sources face restrictions is another. From influence campaigns to permanent infrastructure Tafouk TV illustrates an important evolution in the information contest in the Sahel. Russian and pro-Russian influence in Africa has often relied on social-media networks, influencers, fake experts, local partners or apparently independent media outlets. Tafouk represents something more durable: formal state institutions can now carry many of the same geopolitical narratives openly and continuously. The audience figures are not yet sufficiently established to demonstrate how influential Tafouk TV will become. It may eventually reach far fewer people than some viral online operations, or its television, radio and digital infrastructure may give it far greater long-term significance. Sources Government of Mali — Tafouk TV governing board and strategic mission https://gouvernement.ml/conseil-dadministration-de-tafouk-tv-installe-a-bamako-le-ministre-alhamdou-ag-ilyene-trace-les-orientations-strategiques-de-la-chaine-confederale/ Government of Mali — Abdoulaye Diop and “narrative sovereignty” https://gouvernement.ml/communication-confederale-de-laes-sem-abdoulaye-diop-a-la-decouverte-de-tafouk/ Government of Mali — creation of Tafouk TV and Daandè Liptako https://gouvernement.ml/conseil-national-de-la-transition-le-cnt-adopte-deux-textes-majeurs-relatifs-a-la-creation-de-tafouk-tv-et-de-la-radio-daande-liptako/ Government of Mali — ratification and information-sovereignty objectives https://gouvernement.ml/2026/05/30/ Government of Mali — Tafouk TV board and Prime Minister Abdoulaye Maïga https://gouvernement.ml/television-de-lalliance-des-etats-du-sahel-tafouk-tv-les-membres-du-conseil-dadministration-prennent-les-orientations-et-conseils-du-premier-ministre-abdoulaye-maiga/ RT en français — cooperation agreement between RT and Tafouk TV https://rtenfrance.tv/news/136036-rt-devient-premier-partenaire-international-tafouk-tv-chaine-commune-aes APA News — Tafouk TV and Daandè Liptako common AES media infrastructure https://fr.apanews.net/communication/tafouk-tv-et-daande-liptako-le-mali-consolide-les-medias-communs-de-laes/ APA News — Tafouk TV begins regular programming https://fr.apanews.net/communication/aes-tafouk-tv-demarre-ses-programmes/ Financial Times — Sahel juntas launch Tafouk TV with Russian backing https://www.ft.com/content/259b49a1-8eda-4e8d-84c7-45323988b07b Reporters Without Borders — 2026 Press Freedom Index: Africa https://rsf.org/en/classement/2026/afrique Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode18 #TafoukTV #AES #AllianceOfSahelStates #Sahel #Mali #BurkinaFaso #Niger #Russia #RussianInfluence #RussianMedia #RT #RussiaToday #StateMedia #StatePropaganda #InformationSovereignty #NarrativeSovereignty #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #StrategicCommunication #MediaInfluence #MediaControl #Propaganda #Disinformation #ForeignInfluence #FIMI #Africa #WestAfrica #MilitaryGovernment #MilitaryRule #SahelMedia #DaandeLiptako #MediaInfrastructure #NarrativeControl #PressFreedom #MediaFreedom #Geopolitics #OSINT #WRLD
Disinformation for hire – the network of 70 fake newsrooms sold as a service The websites looked local. Naija Pulse appeared to cover Nigeria, Echo Berlin Germany, The British Daily Britain, Fifty States the United States and Commonwealth Post Australia. Each had its own branding, articles, supposed journalists and matching social-media presence. Taken individually, they resembled small independent news outlets. According to Anthropic, however, they were parts of a single commercial influence network spanning six continents. Anthropic’s September 2026 threat report identifies the operation as GTG-54002, a commercial “influence-as-a-service” network that used Claude to generate and rewrite political content at industrial scale. Investigators linked roughly 70 fabricated news websites to around 70 matching X accounts and more than 250 additional inauthentic commenting accounts designed to create the appearance of genuine public engagement. The network produced at least 8,913 articles in about 20 languages before Anthropic disrupted the activity. The significance of the case is not simply the number of fake sites. It is the business model. The network did not consistently promote one government, party or ideology. Anthropic found that its political position changed according to the apparent interests of different customers. The company therefore described it as a commercial influence operation: political manipulation offered in much the same way as other outsourced digital services. A fake media ecosystem built at scale Anthropic says the infrastructure was created rapidly. Domains were registered from France during a roughly ten-week period in mid-2025 and deployed through shared technical infrastructure, allowing investigators to connect publications that outwardly appeared unrelated. Most of the supporting social-media accounts were also created within a narrow timeframe in June and July 2025. The sites were designed to look like functioning local newsrooms rather than anonymous propaganda pages. Articles carried fabricated bylines belonging to journalists who, according to Anthropic, did not exist. Each outlet had a corresponding account on X, while a second layer of fake profiles commented on and amplified the articles. Many of those accounts used AI-generated profile photographs. The result was a three-tier structure: the newsroom published the story, the branded social account distributed it, and apparently ordinary users supplied the appearance of public reaction. Some of those sites remained publicly visible after the operation was exposed. The British Daily, for example, described itself as providing “conservative insights” on British sovereignty and migration, while Commonwealth Post presented itself as an Australian liberal publication focused on democracy, migration and regional security. Those contrasting editorial identities illustrate the central feature identified by Anthropic: the network was capable of taking different political positions in different markets. Claude as a publishing engine Claude was not simply asked to draft occasional articles. The operators built a structured production pipeline around it. Prompts required fixed JSON outputs, formatted HTML, precise character limits and internal links, allowing articles to move directly into an automated publishing workflow. The system could generate entirely new material or take reporting produced by legitimate journalists and rewrite it to fit a desired political perspective. Anthropic identified three recurring techniques. The same source article could be rewritten in opposite ideological directions for different audiences; a political interpretation could be added to a story that originally contained none; and material could be moved from one country to another after its original context had been removed. The articles were also structured to improve the apparent authority of the sites in search engines, helping the network imitate ordinary digital publishing practices rather than simply broadcasting propaganda. This is where generative AI changes the economics of an influence operation. A conventional network of dozens of supposedly local publications would normally require writers, translators, editors and social-media staff. Here, much of that production could be standardised and automated while human operators concentrated on political direction, customer requirements and distribution. The DRC–Rwanda conflict as a test case The clearest concentration of activity involved the Democratic Republic of Congo. Anthropic identified 318 articles concerning the DRC across the fake-news network. The material generally supported positions aligned with the Congolese government, particularly on regional mineral agreements and tensions with Rwanda. Early in the network’s growth, many of the fake social-media personas following and amplifying its accounts also presented themselves as Congolese. Investigators observed one especially revealing episode on 11 September 2025, when multiple sites published almost identical articles about the DRC–Rwanda conflict within approximately three minutes of one another. The wording and political tone were adjusted for different regional audiences, while associated X accounts distributed the links in a coordinated pattern. Anthropic said the activity contained signals suggesting that one or more customers had interests connected to the DRC–Rwanda conflict. It did not, however, identify those customers and explicitly stated that it found no evidence that any government had directed the operation. That distinction is essential. The content may have benefited a political actor without demonstrating that the actor commissioned or controlled it. Influence without ideology Commercialisation is what distinguishes GTG-54002 from many state-linked information operations. A government propaganda network usually has an identifiable strategic direction. A commercial influence provider does not need one. Its infrastructure can support one position in one country and the opposite position somewhere else, provided different customers are willing to pay. That makes attribution more difficult. Analysts cannot necessarily infer the operator from the ideology of the content because ideology may simply be part of the service package. The enduring asset is the infrastructure: domains, publishing systems, fake journalists, social-media accounts and automated amplification. Anthropic says the operation was disrupted before it achieved significant genuine reach. It classified GTG-54002 as Category Two on the Brookings Breakout Scale: material circulated across the network’s own sites and associated social accounts but showed no evidence of substantial penetration into authentic communities. Most of the 8,913 articles generated little observable engagement from real users. That limited impact is important. The case should not be presented as a successful global manipulation campaign. It is better understood as evidence that the infrastructure required to run such campaigns has become cheaper, faster and increasingly commoditised. The deeper shift is that a fake media ecosystem no longer has to be built around a single political cause. It can be built once, automated and then repurposed for the next customer. Disinformation, in this model, is no longer only a political instrument as it turend into the service. Sources: Anthropic — Countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 Business Standard — AI scaling fake newsrooms, surveillance and online scams https://www.business-standard.com/technology/tech-news/anthropic-report-ai-fake-newsrooms-dating-surveillance-scams-126091100730_1.html Mimikama — KI baut 70 erfundene Nachrichtenportale https://www.mimikama.org/ki-netzwerk-erfundene-nachrichtenportale-echo-berlin/ Poliscoop Media — Anthropic exposes DRC propaganda network https://www.poliscoopmedia.com/articles/anthropic-exposes-drc-propaganda-network-20260911 The British Daily — example of a fabricated outlet identified in the network https://www.british-daily.com/contact Commonwealth Post — example of a fabricated outlet identified in the network https://commonwealth-post.com/category/science MalPulse — infrastructure references for network domains https://www.malpulse.com/infra-pivots/usom-pivots/list/?page=1105 Keywords: #DISINFORMED #Episode13 #DisinformationAsAService #InfluenceAsAService #FakeNewsrooms #FakeMedia #SyntheticMedia #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #Disinformation #InfluenceOperations #InformationWarfare #FIMI #CommercialInfluence #PoliticalManipulation #NarrativeManipulation #NarrativeLaundering #SourceLaundering #MediaImpersonation #FakeJournalists #SyntheticPersonas #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #CoordinatedInauthenticBehaviour #CIB #DigitalInfluence #AutomatedPropaganda #ContentAutomation #AIPropaganda #LKMCompany #NaijaPulse #AxumVoices #JamboJournal #EchoBerlin #TheBritishDaily #FiftyStates #CommonwealthPost #DRC #Rwanda #OSINT #WRLD

Iran’s cognitive warfare – when AI becomes the operating layer of state propaganda Iranian state-linked influence operators were not using artificial intelligence simply to write faster social-media posts. According to Anthropic’s September 2026 threat intelligence report, three separate operations connected to Iranian propaganda institutions were using Claude to help construct the machinery behind what the operators themselves called “soft war” and “cognitive warfare” – non-military efforts intended to shape public opinion inside Iran and abroad. Anthropic linked the activity to the Islamic Culture and Communications Organization (ICCO), which operates under Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance; the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi; and the Bina Cultural Observatory, part of the Islamic Propaganda Organization. The company said each operation was run by someone working within or on behalf of the named institution. The attribution was based on a combination of account telemetry, institutional references disclosed during conversations, branded documents and open-source corroboration. Anthropic subsequently removed the accounts. AI as an operational headquarters The most significant feature of the operation was the role assigned to AI. Claude was used to develop campaign plans, doctrine manuals, coded project portfolios, persona systems, target databases, early-warning protocols, amplification schedules and ministerial planning documents. Anthropic described the model as the principal administrative and operational layer supporting the three campaigns, allowing relatively small groups of operators to create organisational structures and planning material that would otherwise have required a much larger staff. This distinction matters. The reported use of AI went considerably beyond content generation. Operators were using the model to help organise how influence activity should function: which audiences to target, which identities should deliver particular narratives, how official material should be repackaged and when amplification should take place. Human operators still determined objectives and supplied the underlying political doctrine; AI helped translate those decisions into an operational system. Anthropic found that all three operations explicitly connected their activity to Jihad al-Tabyin, often translated as “explanatory jihad”, a concept used within the Iranian state system to frame information activity as both a strategic and ideological responsibility. In internal planning material examined by the company, this doctrine was not merely rhetorical: it informed manuals and campaign structures used by the operators. ‘Not the narrator, but the director’ One sentence contained in the ICCO material captures the model particularly clearly. According to Anthropic, an operator described the role of Iranian cultural attachés as being “not to be the narrator, but the director” of the narrative. The distinction reveals the logic of attribution laundering. Instead of publishing an overt state message and asking foreign audiences to believe it, the operator attempts to create the appearance that the same narrative emerged independently from journalists, activists, foreign writers or ordinary citizens. Anthropic found that Claude was used specifically to make content appear to come from foreign authors or independent media organisations and to design hashtag campaigns that looked grassroots rather than centrally organised. The ICCO operation reportedly used the organisation’s international cultural network as part of this structure. Anthropic found ministerial-level documents carrying official ICCO branding, including a nine-part international influence portfolio. This makes the operation particularly significant because the infrastructure was not limited to anonymous social-media accounts; it intersected with formal state institutions and an existing network of cultural representation abroad. A multilingual content factory A second operation was associated with the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi and what Anthropic described as a “cognitive warfare command room” operating from a seminary in Mashhad. Its organisers ran a multi-province content production system known internally as Manjanegh, or “Catapult”. According to Anthropic, dozens of activists were involved in repackaging publicly available reporting from Iranian security institutions under different personas so that the material no longer appeared directly connected to those institutions. The network used Claude to transform official government intelligence bulletins into customised material in Farsi, Arabic, Urdu, Malay, Spanish and English, while planning expansion into a total of 20 languages. Distribution extended across Iranian platforms such as Eitaa, Bale and Rubika and international services including X, Instagram, Telegram, TikTok and YouTube. Anthropic also documented paid amplification across more than 100 Iranian channels, including channels associated with IRGC narratives. The scale should nevertheless be interpreted carefully. Anthropic documented production infrastructure and some real-world dissemination, but it did not demonstrate that all planned campaigns were fully deployed or that they meaningfully changed public opinion. The company placed the operation in Category Three of its Breakout Scale, indicating multi-platform activity with content observed in external distribution channels, rather than evidence of strategic impact on entire populations. From security bulletins to apparently independent voices The Bina Cultural Observatory operation provides another example of the same architecture. Anthropic linked a director-level official at Bina to activity in which Claude generated messaging in the voice of an IRGC spokesperson. During the 2026 US–Israel–Iran war, the network also attributed false claims to Western institutions including CSIS, Brookings and RAND. The apparent objective was to make Iranian state-aligned claims look as though they had been independently validated by respected foreign research organisations. That technique is more sophisticated than simply publishing propaganda under a false name. It attempts to manufacture a chain of external validation: official information is transformed into apparently independent commentary, which can then be recirculated as evidence that outside observers have reached the same conclusion. Anthropic also found target databases naming international officials and Iranian opposition figures, as well as aggressive counter-narrative material directed against the Bahá’í community. These findings show that the infrastructure was designed not only for broad messaging but also for targeted influence activity against specific groups and individuals. What AI changed The Iranian operations described by Anthropic did not create a new doctrine of influence. Iran has used cultural institutions, official media, aligned organisations and covert or semi-covert online networks for years. What AI changed was the economics and organisational capacity of that model. A relatively small team could use the system to draft doctrine, create personas, translate material, structure target databases, produce campaign calendars and generate multiple versions of the same message for different audiences. The operator remained responsible for intent, political direction and selection of targets. AI reduced the amount of human labour required to turn those decisions into a functioning influence operation. The most revealing part of the case is therefore not that an Iranian propaganda network used a chatbot. It is that AI was being treated as part of the back office of information warfare – a system for converting state doctrine into apparently decentralised, multilingual and plausibly independent voices. Sources Anthropic — Detecting and countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 Iran International — Iran state-aligned accounts used Claude to push IRGC narratives https://www.iranintl.com/en/202609105561 BNE IntelliNews — Yemen missile cell used AI to write guidance software, Anthropic says https://new.intellinews.com/articles/yemen-missile-cell-used-ai-to-write-guidance-software-anthropic-says-467296 This is Beirut — Anthropic report details Iranian propaganda operations https://thisisbeirut.com.lb/news/politics/anthropic-report-details-iranian-propaganda-operations-and-yemen-missile-development-using-claude Anthropic report — PDF mirror https://static.foxbusiness.com/foxbusiness.com/content/uploads/2026/09/anthropic-detecting-and-countering-091026-1.pdf Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode11 #Iran #IranianInfluence #IranianPropaganda #CognitiveWarfare #SoftWar #JihadAlTabyin #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #SyntheticMedia #NarrativeManipulation #NarrativeLaundering #AttributionLaundering #PersonaNetworks #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #StatePropaganda #IslamicCultureAndCommunicationsOrganization #ICCO #IslamicPropagandaOrganization #KhorasanRazavi #IRGC #MultilingualInfluence #Targeting #Amplification #OSINT #WRLD

Anonymous gets involved and announces new revelations in the Guilfoyle scandal: "What's even more intense is yet to come." https://t.co/dB2cdIbPAJ #Anonymous #dezvăluiri #scandal (translated)
The Return to Feudalism in 21st Century Garb A simple observer's viewpoint, with no claim to hold any absolute truth. The Veneer Cracks There is something strangely archaic about the world unfolding before our eyes, despite its satellites, artificial intelligence, and promises of infinite progress. Here and there, we witness heads of state behaving like feudal lords of another age, patiently nibbling away at the neighboring territory, redrawing borders through force rather than law, as if governing a nation mattered less than expanding one's fiefdom. No names need be mentioned here: current events provide plenty of illustration, and each reader will recognize, according to their own geography and moment of reading, the faces that embody this observation. But this return to the archaic is not confined to grand geopolitical stages. It also permeates the most ordinary daily life—that of social media, where anyone can pour out venom against another without filter, without form, and often without the slightest argument. The verbal jousting of yesteryear, with its codes, its rhetoric, its tacit limits, has given way to raw invective, snap judgment, instant condemnation. We no longer debate: we execute, verbally—and sometimes it doesn't stop at words. The Vanished Inhibition What strikes one, in this dual observation—macro-political and micro-social—is the lifting of an inhibition we thought firmly anchored. Centuries of cultural construction, education, philosophy, sometimes religion, had patiently shaped mechanisms of restraint: politeness as social ritual, argumentation as a mode of resolving disagreement, respect for one's opponent as the very foundation of democratic debate. This civilizational veneer, however fragile it always was, seemed to hold. Today it is cracking, and the question—which for me remains a simple hypothesis, not a certainty—is why. A convenient explanation would blame social media: anonymity, the distance of the screen, the instantaneousness of publication would favor verbal acting-out without the usual mediation of reflection. This is probably true, but likely insufficient. For technology here is only an accelerant, an amplifier—not necessarily a root cause. A Poorly Formatted Neocortex? The more unsettling hypothesis—and I frame it explicitly as hypothesis, not scientifically established fact—is that of a failure in the formation of moral judgment and tolerance toward otherness. The human brain possesses the neural structures enabling empathy, the distancing of impulsive reaction, the acceptance of difference—but these capacities are not innate in their full exercise: they must be built, educated, cultivated, like a muscle that needs patient training from childhood onward. If this education in otherness, nuance, and tolerance of disagreement erodes—for multiple and undoubtedly complex reasons that are not mine to settle here—then older reflexes resurface: instinctive distrust of the stranger outside the clan, the law of the strongest, the logic of territorial or symbolic predation. The other ceases to be a possible interlocutor and becomes once again a potential threat, unless they belong to my tribe, my clan, my party, my digital bubble. Two Scales, One Logic What is striking, in this deliberately provocative reading, is the structural similarity between these two scales. The leader who invades a neighbor in the name of a rediscovered greatness or a reinvented historical right, and the anonymous internet user who insults a stranger in the name of an unnegotiable conviction, may obey the same underlying grammar: that of territory to defend, clan to protect, the other to subdue or exclude rather than understand. The form has changed—satellites instead of horses, tweets instead of heralds—but the substance, in this reading that remains mine alone and commits no one else, seems strangely identical to that of feudal rivalries: the absence of a recognized third party, of an accepted common rule, of a respected arbitrating authority. Everyone becomes judge and party, lord of their own digital or territorial fiefdom. A Civilization on a Knife's Edge Norbert Elias, in his Civilizing Process, showed how Western societies had historically built, with remarkable slowness, an increasing control over impulses and direct violence, in favor of more sublimated forms of social regulation. What we may be observing today—and I stress again the conditional—is a form of regression in this process, or at least a fragilization of the veneer it had patiently laid down. Should we see this as an effect of great technological accelerations, which shake up our cognitive rhythms without leaving education time to adapt? A deeper crisis of the institutions tasked with transmitting these values of tolerance—school, family, religion, the rule of law? Or simply a cyclical movement of human history, where phases of policed civilization alternate with darker backlashes? I have no certain answer, and I would be wary of anyone claiming to hold one. In Conclusion, a Shared Concern This text is only a viewpoint, necessarily partial and subjective, on a world that sometimes seems to replay ancient logics in new clothing. Perhaps I am wrong to perceive a continuity between the feudal lord and the contemporary dictator, between the anonymous online insult and the absence of education in nuance. Perhaps these phenomena are unrelated, or too complex to be thus summarized. But if this reading, even partially, hits the mark, then the question that arises is less one of technological regulation—though necessary—than the far more arduous question of how to rebuild, generation after generation, this capacity to accept the other in their difference, to debate without destroying, to coexist without necessarily dominating. This undertaking, if it exists, will not be resolved by an algorithm nor by an international treaty. It plays out, patiently, in the most elementary education—the one that teaches a child that the other is not a threat, but a possibility. Bibliography Elias, N. (1939). Über den Prozess der Zivilisation [The Civilizing Process]. Oxford: Blackwell (Eng. trans. 1978-1982). Lorenz, K. (1963). Das sogenannte Böse [On Aggression]. London: Methuen (Eng. trans. 1966). Arendt, H. (1970). On Violence. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. Han, B.-C. (2013). Im Schwarm [In the Swarm: Digital Prospects]. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (Eng. trans. 2017).
Storm-1516 – Russia’s information war arrives early in France’s 2027 election France will not elect its next president until April 2027, but the information operations surrounding the campaign have already begun. In late July and August 2026, fabricated stories targeted several prominent figures associated with the presidential race, including Raphaël Glucksmann, Gabriel Attal and former prime minister Édouard Philippe. The methods included fake news websites copying established French media, impersonated journalists, AI-generated voices and manipulated video. French authorities identified the Russian operation known as Storm-1516 behind several of these campaigns. Other attacks were linked to Matryoshka, another Russia-aligned influence network. The timing is significant. Storm-1516 began targeting the French presidential environment roughly nine months before the first round, scheduled for 18 April 2027. Rather than a single disinformation campaign, the activity demonstrates how Russian influence networks can establish narratives and infrastructure long before an election reaches its decisive phase. A fake scandal targeting Raphaël Glucksmann One of the clearest examples appeared at the end of July. A website impersonating the French independent outlet Blast published a fabricated investigation claiming that journalist Léa Salamé had attempted to bribe media organisations in exchange for favourable coverage of her partner, Raphaël Glucksmann. The operation went beyond copying the appearance of a legitimate news site. The identities of real journalists were appropriated and a manipulated video used an AI-generated imitation of the voice of Edwy Plenel, founder of Mediapart, supposedly confirming the allegations. The accusation was false. On 4 August, Glucksmann said France's General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, the SGDSN, had informed him that he had been targeted by Storm-1516. Two days later, the Paris prosecutor's office opened an investigation into suspected Russian interference. The importance of the operation was not the quality of one particular deepfake but the construction of several mutually reinforcing elements: a fake media organisation, impersonated journalists, synthetic audio and social-media accounts distributing the material. Together they created the impression that the allegation had been independently corroborated. Different candidates, overlapping Russian networks Édouard Philippe was also targeted by fabricated stories claiming that he suffered from dementia and was medically incapable of running for president. VIGINUM attributed the operation to Storm-1516. Gabriel Attal faced another wave of false content, including fabricated stories mimicking the identities of French outlets such as RFI, BFM TV, France 24, AFP, Le Parisien, Libération and Le Monde. Some claimed that Attal had symptoms of Parkinson's disease or links to drug trafficking. Attribution here is more complicated. French reporting connected at least part of the campaign against Attal to Matryoshka, rather than Storm-1516. A later digitally manipulated video, apparently associated with Storm-1516, used genuine LCI footage from an August debate but added a white earpiece to Attal, suggesting that someone had secretly been feeding him answers. NewsGuard compared the circulating clip with authentic LCI footage and found no earpiece in the original. The distinction is important. France is not facing a single Russian propaganda operation but several overlapping networks using similar techniques and narratives. Treating every manipulation as Storm-1516 would obscure how this ecosystem actually functions. The real weapon is media impersonation The most interesting feature of Storm-1516 is not artificial intelligence itself. It is the systematic appropriation of the credibility of established journalism. Instead of relying only on anonymous Telegram channels or social-media profiles, operators create material that looks as though it originated from organisations audiences already recognise. A fabricated investigation can resemble Blast, a manipulated television report can borrow LCI's visual identity, while fake journalists and social-media accounts provide additional layers of apparent confirmation. VIGINUM has documented this architecture extensively. Its 2025 investigation analysed 77 Storm-1516 information operations and described a mature Russian system using fabricated media, websites and distribution networks to promote anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western narratives. The European External Action Service found that the infrastructure continued to expand. According to its 2026 FIMI Threat Report, Storm-1516 almost doubled its output during 2025. Five networks created that year to target French, German, American, Moldovan and international audiences comprised 453 websites, including fictional news organisations and sites impersonating genuine media or political platforms. A typical operation therefore follows a recognisable pattern: a fabricated allegation is supported by synthetic or manipulated evidence, published through an apparently legitimate source and then distributed by networks of accounts that create the appearance of wider discussion. AI makes this process faster and cheaper, but the fundamental objective remains the same – to manufacture credibility. Why begin nine months before an election? VIGINUM concluded that Storm-1516 is capable both of reacting rapidly to current events and of conducting longer campaigns aimed at discrediting Western institutions and public figures, particularly around elections and other major political events. This provides important context for France. Storm-1516 activity around the presidential race became visible in July 2026, approximately nine months before voting begins. There is no public evidence of a predetermined Russian “nine-month plan”, and the timing should not be presented as such. Early activity nevertheless provides operational advantages: narratives can be tested, websites and accounts established, audience reactions measured and the responses of journalists, authorities and fact-checkers observed. The first operations may therefore also provide information about which themes and techniques are most effective before the campaign enters its decisive months. This remains an analytical interpretation rather than a demonstrated statement of the operators' intentions. Russian operation, but what about the GRU? Attribution requires similar precision. VIGINUM explicitly describes Storm-1516 as a Russian information operation, and French authorities have attributed individual campaigns to it with high confidence. Connections with Russian military intelligence have also been reported. Glucksmann said the SGDSN informed him that the network targeting him was controlled by Russia's GRU, while French media have repeatedly described Storm-1516 as linked to Russian military intelligence. However, VIGINUM's publicly available technical documentation describes Storm-1516 primarily as a Russian information modus operandi, rather than identifying it as a formally established GRU unit. It is therefore well supported to describe Storm-1516 as a Russian influence operation with reported links to military intelligence. Saying simply that Storm-1516 is a GRU unit would go beyond what France's published technical evidence currently establishes. An early warning for the French election There is also no evidence that the operations have so far had a significant effect on French voters. Some of the fabricated material generated only limited engagement, and measuring the real impact of foreign information operations remains extremely difficult. Even a video attracting hundreds of thousands of views does not establish how many viewers believed it or whether it changed political attitudes. The significance of Storm-1516 lies instead in the infrastructure already being deployed. Months before the election, Russian influence networks have been able to test fake newsrooms, synthetic voices, manipulated television footage, candidate-specific narratives and systems for distributing them. The French case illustrates a broader evolution in election interference. The objective is no longer simply to place false claims on social media. Modern operations can manufacture an entire chain of apparent evidence in which a fake journalist cites a fake investigation, synthetic audio appears to confirm it and networks of accounts give the impression that an authentic controversy is unfolding. France still has months to go before its presidential election. The information environment surrounding it is already being contested. Sources: VIGINUM / SGDSN — Storm-1516 analysis https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/publications/analyse-du-mode-operatoire-informationnel-russe-storm-1516 VIGINUM / SGDSN — Full Storm-1516 technical report https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/Publications/20250507_TLP-CLEAR_NP_SGDSN_VIGINUM_Technical%20report_Storm-1516.pdf VIGINUM / SGDSN — Storm-1516 operation targeting Emmanuel Macron https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/publications/storm-1516-detection-dune-operation-dingerence-numerique-etrangere-ciblant-emmanuel EEAS — 4th Report on FIMI Threats https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026/documents/EEAS%204th%20Threat%20Report_web.pdf Le Monde — Russian interference targeting Philippe, Glucksmann and Attal https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2026/08/07/presidentielle-2027-glucksmann-attal-philippe-les-ingerences-russes-s-invitent-dans-la-campagne_6740451_823448.html Le Monde — Storm-1516 and Matryoshka analysis https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2026/08/06/ingerences-russes-pourquoi-il-ne-faut-pas-nourrir-le-troll_6739956_4408996.html NewsGuard Risk Briefing — Russian activity targeting the French election https://newsguardriskbriefing.substack.com/p/russia-targets-french-elections-iran Euronews — Operation targeting Raphaël Glucksmann https://fr.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/08/04/presidentielle-de-2027-raphael-glucksmann-vise-par-une-operation-de-destabilisation-russe Télérama / AFP — Glucksmann deepfake investigation https://www.telerama.fr/debats-reportages/presidentielle-2027-raphael-glucksmann-vise-par-un-deepfake-d-origine-russe-7032318.php Le Parisien — Operation targeting Gabriel Attal https://www.leparisien.fr/elections/presidentielle/presidentielle-2027-gabriel-attal-a-son-tour-vise-par-une-ingerence-en-provenance-de-russie-05-08-2026-I3Z67Z7ZUBDUVBXUNDARI5KGPA.php Euronews — Paris prosecutor investigations into suspected Russian interference https://fr.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/08/18/soupcons-dingerence-russe-visant-attal-et-philippe-le-parquet-de-paris-ouvre-dune-enquete Keywords: #DISINFORMED #Episode6 #Storm1516 #France #FrenchElection2027 #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #RussianInfluence #RussianDisinformation #Propaganda #Deepfakes #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #SyntheticMedia #FakeNews #MediaImpersonation #FakeMedia #DigitalManipulation #ElectionInterference #PoliticalDisinformation #Matryoshka #VIGINUM #OSINT #CyberInfluence #DigitalInfluence #MediaManipulation #EuropeanSecurity #Democracy #WRLD

Dzisiejszy stream wyjawił że my fani jesteśmy w sekretnym kulcie YoungMultiKulti i wspomaga nas tajna grupa hakerów anonymous żeby wznowić vlogi. https://t.co/Rbnh91uIma #YoungMultiKulti #stream #vlogi
It's pure homophobia endorsed by thousands of anonymous accounts and, for some reason, @kittypurrzog #Homophobia #LGBTQ #Accountability #Thetweetdoesnotmentionanyspecificcountries #sotherearenocountrycodestoreturn.
Wild story from Czechia: a prankster posing as the operator of an anonymous conspiracy account contacted Foreign Minister Petr Macinka. Within hours, Macinka agreed to meet him secretly, without police protection, at a site staged with fake weapons and explosives. https://t.co/xIPVe43wWT #Czechia #prank #conspiracy #CZ
🚨 DATAREPUBLICAN.COM STRIKES AGAIN: TRUMPBLOGS, FORMERLY KNOWN AS NOBLOGS 🚨 🏴 THE ANARCHIST INTERNATIONAL ON NOBLOGS, MAPPED — EVERY BLOG, EVERY CELL, EVERY CITY. 🌍 The militant far-left has spent years hiding in plain sight on Noblogs.org — the anonymous blog network that quietly powers antifa, anarchist, squat, and "solidarity" cells around the world. So on my own time, for free, I scraped the whole thing. Because I kick commie *** for fun and need no government funding or sanction for it. Introducing an interactive map of 7000+ blogs across many countries and languages — antifascist, anarchist, ecological, prisoner-solidarity, migrant-border, revolutionary. Every one classified, geolocated, and searchable down to the verbatim quote. * 🔥 Verified quotes. Every claim is a receipt — their words, not mine. * 🌐 4000-plus blogs pinned to a live world map — zoom into your own city. * ⚔️ Many blogs classified "operational." * 🕸️ Click any blog, author, or cell and walk the network one tie at a time. No grant funded this. No client asked for it. I do this for free, on my own time, because someone should. 🖥️ Data-heavy! Best viewed on desktop. 📖 A preview of what's coming: DataRepublican v2.0 — full site redesign — launches soon, ahead of my and @JoshuaLisec book UNELECTED (Passage Press, Oct 13). And yes — if I can map the anarchist international in my spare time, I can map anything. https://x.com/DataRepublican/status/2094285318170018166
Empathy, Compassion, and the Limits of Emotional Moral Judgment Empathy is widely regarded as a foundation of morality, but psychological research suggests that it is not an unqualified virtue. Paul Bloom (2017) argues that affective empathy—the experience of sharing another person’s feelings—has important limitations when used as a guide for moral judgment. First, empathy is biased. We respond more strongly to suffering that is vivid, identifiable, and psychologically close. Research on the “identifiable victim effect” shows that people can be more willing to help a specific individual than anonymous victims, even when the latter represent a much larger number (Kogut & Ritov, 2005; Lee & Feeley, 2016). Emotional salience therefore does not necessarily correspond to moral significance. Second, empathy is innumerate. Human emotional responses do not naturally scale with the number of people suffering. A single identifiable victim can evoke a powerful response, while thousands or millions of anonymous victims may produce comparatively little emotional engagement. This creates a problem when moral decisions concern suffering on a large scale (Bloom, 2017). Third, empathy can be exhausting. Repeatedly sharing the distress of others may produce empathic distress and emotional fatigue. Research suggests an important distinction between empathic resonance and compassion: while empathic engagement can increase negative affect, compassion can promote positive affect, motivation, and prosocial behaviour (Klimecki et al., 2014; Weng et al., 2013). The implication is not that we should care less. Rather, caring and feeling are not the same thing. Compassion allows us to recognize suffering and remain motivated to alleviate it without necessarily absorbing the suffering ourselves. Empathy may therefore be valuable for human connection, but it is a poor stand-alone system for making large-scale moral decisions. When millions of lives, limited resources, and competing needs are involved, compassion must be combined with reason, evidence, and deliberate judgment. The goal should not be to feel everything others feel. It should be to care deeply enough to help, while remaining clear-headed enough to help effectively. References: Bloom (2017); Kogut & Ritov (2005); Klimecki et al. (2014); Lee & Feeley (2016); Weng et al. (2013). Empathy and Its Discontents https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/27916513/?utm_source=chatgpt.com
@LianaFix The US is not changing its (pivoting, pull-out) policy toward Europe. Its Big problems are in Iran. And what Russia is doing there. I doubt there was any discussion of "baltics". That was gaslighting by anonymous officials to avoid tough questions on Russia providing targeting #USPolicy #Russia #Iran #US #IR #RU
🚨 I think this news around Ox Alpha is much more important than it looks because its emergence says something much deeper about the actual state of the AI industry. 📈 Ox Alpha appeared anonymously on OpenRouter with around 1 million tokens of context, multimodal capabilities https://t.co/rft3YB92Td #AIIndustry #OxAlpha #OpenRouter #Nospecificcountrycodesarementionedinthetweet.
Mass trials without due process in El Salvador: Judges are afraid. They’re convicting everyone — Prosecutors and the courts are securing convictions based on opaque police files, anonymous allegations and trials conducted behind closed doors https://t.co/P7vXnJwxK5 #ElSalvador #HumanRights #JusticeSystem #SV